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Introduction	
	 Since	the	year	2000,	the	number	of	deaths	due	to	terrorism	globally	has	risen	from	less	than	five	thousand	per	year	to	over	thirty	thousand	(Global	Terrorism	Index,	2015).	Though	number	of	annual	deaths	due	to	terrorism	has	shown	a	general	upward	trend	since	2001,	this	trend	has	risen	more	sharply	since	2012,	particularly	in	the	Middle	East	and	Africa	(Global	Terrorism	Index,	2015).		Such	a	substantial	increase	in	the	global	death	toll	due	to	terrorism	creates	humanitarian	crises,	geopolitical	instability,	and	challenges	states’	basic	obligations	to	ensure	the	security	of	their	citizens.	That	the	death	toll	inflicted	by	terrorism	has	risen	so	substantially	in	areas	with	long	histories	of	foreign	intervention	suggests	a	relationship	between	foreign	intervention	and	the	global	incidence	of	terrorism.		Due	to	this	apparent	correlation,	and	the	general	upward	trend	in	rates	of	terrorism,	it	becomes	increasingly	important	for	states	to	understand	how	interference	in	the	internal	conflicts	of	other	states	may	affect	the	probability	of	becoming	the	target	of	terrorist	attacks.	Because	civil	conflicts	can	foster	the	root	causes	of	terrorism	and	often	become	internationalized,	understanding	the	potential	relationship	between	intervention	in	these	conflicts	and	international	terrorism	should	represent	a	crucial	policy	concern	for	states.	The	2015	terrorist	attacks	in	Paris,	for	which	Islamic	State	cited	France’s	interventions	in	Iraq	and	Syria	as	justification,	clearly	illustrate	that	a	nuanced	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	international	terrorism	may	help	states	to	ensure	their	national	security.		
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This	thesis	examines	the	relationship	between	third	party	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	likelihood	that	an	intervening	state	will	become	the	target	of	terrorist	attacks	by	other	combatants	in	that	conflict.	In	doing	so,	this	thesis	builds	off	of	the	root	causes	theory	of	terrorism	to	examine	how	different	types	of	intervention	might	exacerbate	or	alleviate	conditions	that	foster	the	emergence	of	terrorist	organizations	in	civil	conflict	areas,	or	affect	public	support	and	recruitment	opportunities	for	terrorist	organizations	once	they	emerge.	By	utilizing	principal-agent	theory	this	thesis	examines	the	potential	dangers	that	states	may	face	when	enlisting	governments	or	insurgent	organizations	as	agents	within	an	internationalized	civil	conflict.	This	thesis	considers	the	effects	of	direct	military	support	for	a	belligerent	in	a	civil	conflict	versus	indirect	material	or	logistical	support	to	determine	whether	different	tactics	deployed	during	an	intervention	affect	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	reprisals	in	different	ways.		Similarly,	this	thesis	examines	interventions	on	behalf	of	governments	and	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	separately	to	determine	if	the	type	of	actor	that	an	intervening	state	supports	has	differing	effects	on	the	incidence	of	international	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state.		Existing	literature	addresses	the	root	causes	of	terrorism,	why	domestic	populations	and	states	may	support	terrorist	organizations,	the	motives	of	terrorist	organizations,	and	the	effect	of	intervention	on	the	incidence	of	international	terrorism.	It	is	well	understood	that	certain	social	factors	may	cause	terrorist	groups	to	form,	and	that	it	may	be	strategically	beneficial	for	some	populations	and	states	to	support	terrorist	organizations.	Scholars	still	debate	what	the	strategic	
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goals	of	terrorism	as	a	tactic	may	be,	and	disagree	as	to	whether	state	intervention	to	resolve	civil	conflicts	increases	or	decreases	the	likelihood	of	international	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state.	The	literature	does	not	address	if	whether	a	state	intervenes	in	support	of	a	government	or	in	support	of	insurgents,	or	whether	the	intervening	state	utilizes	military	or	non-military	forms	of	intervention,	may	lead	to	differing	outcomes.		Differentiating	between	types	of	actor	supported	and	forms	of	intervention	may	clarify	disagreement	within	the	literature	regarding	the	effect	of	state	intervention	on	the	incidence	of	international	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state.	Additionally,	once	the	true	direction	of	the	relationship	between	different	types	of	intervention	and	the	incidence	of	international	terrorism	becomes	better	understood,	it	may	become	easier	to	explain	the	underlying	motives	of	terrorist	organizations.	I	hypothesize	that	intervention	on	behalf	of	governments	and	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	will	both	increase	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state,	but	that	intervention	on	behalf	of	governments	will	do	so	to	a	lesser	degree	than	will	intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations.	I	also	hypothesize	that	deployment	of	ground	forces	in	a	combat	role	during	a	civil	conflict	will	lead	to	higher	rates	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state	than	will	allocation	of	non-military	support.	After	statistical	analysis,	I	found	that	intervention	on	behalf	of	governments	seems	to	have	a	significant	positive	impact	on	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.	Similarly,	warring	support	seems	to	have	a	significant	positive	impact	on	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states	while	non-warring	
	 5	
support	does	not.	Contrary	to	my	hypotheses,	I	found	that	intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	seems	to	have	either	a	negative	or	statistically	insignificant	effect	on	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states1.	Following	this,	states	that	provide	warring	support	to	a	belligerent	within	a	civil	conflict,	or	that	provide	support	to	a	government,	may	incur	a	significant	risk	of	terrorist	reprisals	by	belligerents	within	that	conflict.	These	findings	support	the	general	theory	of	this	thesis,	which	posits	that	the	relationship	between	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	incidence	of	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states	likely	depends	on	the	particular	form	of	intervention	that	a	state	pursues.		
Literature	Review	Extensive	literature	assesses	the	root	causes	of	terrorism,	the	use	of	domestic	terrorism	in	civil	conflicts,	and	the	effectiveness	of	state	responses	to	instances	of	international	terror.		Literature	by	authors	such	as	Crenshaw	(2011),	Newman	(2006),	Pape	and	Feldman	(2010)	provides	a	well-developed	theoretical	groundwork	identifying	social	and	political	factors	that	may	encourage	domestic	support	for	insurgent	organizations	that	employ	terrorist	tactics.	State	support	for	insurgent	organizations	or	governments	as	agents	in	international	disputes	is	also	well	understood	(Bapat	2012).	Though	it	is	understood	why	governments	might	intervene	in	civil	wars	and	how	these	conflicts	can	foster	support	for	terrorist	organizations,	authors	disagree	as	to	what	may	motivate	belligerents	within	civil	conflicts	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics	to	begin	with.	Authors	also	disagree	as	to	how	
																																																								1	Linear	regression	models	predicted	a	negative	relationship	between	support	for	insurgents	and	terrorism	while	logistic	regression	found	no	relationship.		
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third	party	state	intervention	to	resolve	civil	conflicts	influences	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state.		Mueller	(2010),	O’Neil	(2002),	Jett	(2012),	Carpenter	(2006)	and	others	have	come	to	opposing	conclusions	regarding	the	relationship	between	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	and	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state	by	parties	acting	as	belligerents	within	that	conflict.	This	disagreement	is	due,	in	large	part,	to	disagreement	about	what	underlying	strategies	motivate	insurgent	organizations	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics.	Though	plentiful	research	attempts	to	address	the	effect	of	intervention	in	civil	wars	on	the	prevalence	of	international	terrorism	(Malvesti	2001),	the	literature	does	not	effectively	differentiate	between	types	of	state	intervention.		Importantly,	past	research	has	not	considered	whether	a	state	intervenes	in	support	of	a	government	or	in	support	of	insurgent	organizations	may	have	different	effects	on	the	incidence	of	international	terrorism,	nor	has	it	effectively	differentiated	between	different	tactics	used	during	each	intervention.	This	may	help	to	account	for	the	radically	opposing	conclusions	within	the	literature	about	the	relationship	between	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	incidence	of	international	terrorism.	This	thesis	empirically	examines	if	whether	a	state	intervenes	on	behalf	of	a	regime	or	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations,	and	whether	a	state	utilizes	warring	or	non-warring	intervention,	may	have	differing	effects	on	the	probability	of	international	terrorism.	This	differentiation	may	help	to	explain	the	radically	different	conclusions	drawn	by	past	literature.		Certain	demographic,	social,	and	political	factors	are	widely	cited	as	root	causes	for	terrorist	activity.	Extreme	poverty,	systematic	ethnic	or	religious	
	 7	
inequality,	modernization,	and	globalization	are	widely	considered	as	factors	that	may	encourage	individuals	to	support	terrorist	organizations	(Newman	2006).	Poverty	and	systematic	social	inequality	may	act	to	encourage	support	for	extremist	organizations	as	potential	agents	of	social	change	(O’Neill	2002).	Additionally,	an	impoverished	state	likely	does	not	have	the	capability	to	adequately	police	its	territory,	which	may	create	areas	where	extremist	groups	can	flourish	(Newman	2006).	The	processes	of	modernization	and	globalization	may	threaten	traditional	ways	of	life	and	introduce	foreign	value	systems,	which	can	further	increase	support	for	extremist	groups	likely	to	engage	in	terrorism	(Newman	2006).	Such	demographic	factors	should	be	considered	in	an	analysis	of	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	due	to	their	potential	roles	as	root	causes	of	terrorist	activity,	and	the	potential	for	intervention	to	alleviate	or	exacerbate	such	factors.	Like	domestic	populations,	states	may	have	strategic	motives	to	support	insurgent	or	terrorist	organizations	acting	as	combatants	in	a	civil	conflict.	The	decision	by	a	state	to	support	such	organizations	can	be	explained	using	principal-agent	theory	(Bapat	2012).	Specifically,	states	may	utilize	insurgent	organizations	as	agents	within	international	disputes.		During	an	international	dispute,	a	state	may	provide	support	to	insurgent	organizations	that	target	the	opponent	state	(Bapat	2012).		To	this	end,	the	principal	state	may	grant	the	insurgent	organization	acting	as	an	agent	safe	haven	within	the	principal	state’s	boundaries,	and	economic,	material,	or	direct	military	support.	By	strengthening	an	insurgent	organization	acting	as	an	agent	within	a	rival’s	territory,	the	principal	actor	can	weaken	its	rival	since	the	rival	state	may	be	forced	to	divert	additional	resources	to	address	the	
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insurgent	or	terrorist	threat.	More	importantly,	the	principal	state	may	gain	bargaining	power	within	the	dispute	since	the	principal	state	can	offer	to	withdraw	support	for	its	agent	in	exchange	for	concessions.	Similarly,	third	party	states	can	utilize	regimes	besieged	by	insurgent	organizations	as	agents	against	particular	insurgent	or	terrorist	organizations	that	also	threaten	the	intervening	state.		Nonetheless,	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	can	pose	substantial	risks	to	the	intervening	state.	Utilizing	an	insurgent	organization	as	an	agent	poses	risks	since,	strengthened	by	the	support	of	the	principal	state,	the	insurgent	organization	may	eventually	turn	against	the	principal.	Despite	this	risk,	insurgent	organizations	may	provide	a	state	with	a	cost-effective	means	to	increase	bargaining	power	with	a	geopolitical	rival,	or	to	potentially	replace	that	government	if	insurgents	win	the	civil	conflict.	States	may	similarly	support	a	regime	in	a	civil	conflict	to	achieve	such	favorable	outcomes.	Principal-agent	theory	clearly	explains	why	a	state	may	support	insurgent	organizations	or	regimes	in	civil	conflicts.		The	literature	on	civil	conflicts	provides	a	sound	theoretical	basis	for	what	factors	might	motivate	a	state	to	intervene	in	a	civil	conflict,	and	how	the	conditions	of	such	conflicts	can	foster	the	emergence	of	terrorist	groups.	The	decision	by	insurgent	groups	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics	is	less	well	understood.	Some	authors	suggest	that	terrorism	represents	a	rational	choice	that	can	help	an	insurgent	organization	to	achieve	its	stated	political	goals	(Thomas	2014).	The	strategic	model	of	agent	behavior	posits	that	rational	actors	identify	ordered	sets	of	preferred	situational	outcomes,	conduct	cost	benefit	analyses	of	what	courses	of	action	are	likely	to	lead	to	what	outcomes,	and	then	pursue	courses	of	action	that	are	likely	to	
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lead	to	the	most	desirable	outcome	(Abrahms	2008).	Terrorism	may	help	insurgent	organizations	to	achieve	stated	political	goals	by	decreasing	public	support	for	the	regime’s	war	effort.	Targeting	civilians	that	support	a	regime	may	discourage	a	much	wider	audience	of	civilians	from	supporting	that	regime	(Stanton	2013).	Terrorist	tactics	increase	the	civilian	cost	of	war,	which	may	increase	civilian	pressure	on	the	regime	to	end	a	civil	conflict	quickly,	thereby	increasing	the	bargaining	power	of	insurgent	organizations	(Stanton	2013).	Based	on	this	theory,	insurgent	organizations	that	employ	terrorist	tactics	appear	as	rational	actors	with	clear	political	goals.	Some	authors	instead	argue	that	terrorist	organizations	do	not	empirically	seem	to	have	such	clear	motives	since	terrorist	tactics	rarely	lead	to	terrorist	organizations’	stated	political	goals	(Abrahms	2008).	Use	of	terrorist	tactics	may	decrease	an	insurgent	organization’s	bargaining	power	by	eroding	its	legitimacy	and	reinforcing	hardline	military	responses	by	target	regimes	(Abrahms	2008).	Based	on	this,	it	seems	unclear	what	actually	motivates	insurgent	groups	to	adopt	terrorist	tactics.	Abrahms	suggests	that	the	primary	motivation	for	the	use	of	terrorist	tactics	is	not	to	achieve	stated	political	goals,	but	to	encourage	solidarity	among	disenfranchised	populations	by	providing	an	outlet	for	feelings	of	hopelessness	or	rage.	Under	this	theory	terrorist	organizations	may	still	qualify	as	rational	actors,	but	would	have	radically	different	preferences	than	is	typically	assumed.	Additional	theoretical	and	empirical	analysis	of	what	terrorist	organizations	hope	to	achieve	is	crucial	to	formulating	responses	that	can	discourage	the	future	use	of	terrorist	tactics,	and	to	understanding	how	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	could	encourage	or	
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dissuade	belligerents	in	that	conflict	from	utilizing	terrorist	tactics	domestically	and	internationally.		Many	scholars	have	debated	whether	third	party	state	military	intervention	in	civil	conflict	areas	reduces	or	increases	the	risk	that	insurgent	groups	will	deploy	terrorist	tactics	abroad.	Supporting	regimes	embroiled	in	civil	wars	may	help	to	prevent	terrorism	by	giving	said	regimes	the	capability	to	combat	terrorist	organizations	operating	within	their	borders,	and	may	help	to	eventually	build	stable	states	where	extremism	is	unlikely	to	thrive	(Carpenter	2006).	Conversely,	support	for	undemocratic	governments	or	those	responsible	for	human	rights	abuses	may	foster	the	social	conditions	necessary	for	terrorist	groups	to	develop	(Jett	2012).	Direct	military	intervention	in	response	to	terrorist	activity	may	make	the	use	of	terrorist	tactics	exceptionally	costly	and	unattractive	to	insurgent	organizations,	or	may	further	destabilize	a	civil	conflict	area	and	make	the	intervening	state	a	more	viable	target	for	terrorist	retaliation	(Zulaika	2009).	Though	literature	examining	the	use	of	terrorism	in	civil	conflicts	has	established	the	basic	demographic	and	social	conditions	that	lead	to	support	for	terrorist	organizations,	significant	debate	continues	regarding	what	motivates	the	use	of	terrorist	tactics	by	insurgent	organizations	and	how	third	party	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	affects	the	likelihood	of	international	terrorist	attacks	by	belligerents	in	that	conflict.	My	thesis	seeks	to	clarify	this	argument	by	empirically	examining	the	effects	of	state	interventions	in	civil	conflicts	in	support	of	regimes	versus	interventions	in	support	of	insurgent	organizations,	and	by	differentiating	between	specific	tactics	utilized	during	each	intervention.	I	predict	
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that	each	type	of	intervention	will	have	different	effects	on	the	incidence	of	international	terrorism,	and	should	therefore	be	considered	as	different	phenomena.	If	the	effects	of	different	forms	of	intervention	are	empirically	understood,	it	may	become	possible	to	more	thoroughly	understand	the	motives	of	terrorist	organizations	and	how	their	behavior	may	change	in	response	to	state	action.		My	thesis	seeks	to	empirically	determine	which	forms	of	intervention	in	civil	conflict	may	be	beneficial	to	international	security,	and	which	may	be	harmful.	If	this	thesis	successfully	explains	why	past	literature	examining	intervention	and	international	terrorism	has	often	reached	opposing	conclusions,	much	of	the	seeming	ambiguity	and	unpredictability	regarding	terrorist	organizations	as	rational	actors	may	also	be	explained.	
Theory	Regimes	and	insurgent	groups	embroiled	in	civil	wars	often	receive	political,	financial,	or	military	assistance	from	states.	Within	the	context	of	the	Global	War	on	Terror,	states	may	intervene	to	support	regimes	besieged	by	insurgents	classified	as	terrorist	organizations,	or	to	support	insurgents	combating	state	sponsors	of	terrorism.	Intervention	on	behalf	of	a	favorable	regime	may	allow	a	state	to	utilize	that	regime	as	an	agent	against	terrorist	organizations	acting	as	insurgents	in	that	civil	conflict.	Intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	combating	state	sponsors	of	terrorism	may	lead	to	installation	of	a	regime	more	favorable	to	the	intervening	state.	In	either	case,	third	party	state	intervention	may	help	to	restore	stability	and	rule	of	law	within	a	conflict	area,	thus	impeding	the	ability	of	terrorist	groups	to	operate	there.	
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Though	states	may	utilize	intervention	as	a	tool	to	combat	international	terrorism,	intervention	may	actually	increase	the	risk	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state.	When	a	state	intervenes	in	a	conflict	in	support	of	a	government,	the	balance	of	power	in	that	conflict	may	shift	to	the	detriment	of	insurgent	organizations.	Insurgent	organizations	may	then	view	the	intervening	state	as	a	strategically	valuable	target	for	violent	reprisals	since	any	action	that	makes	intervention	more	costly	for	the	third	party	state	may	encourage	that	state	to	withdraw	its	support,	and	thus	shift	the	balance	of	power	in	that	conflict	in	favor	of	the	insurgents.	Due	to	asymmetry	in	the	military	capabilities	of	insurgent	organizations	and	states,	such	reprisals	may	include	terrorist	attacks.		Intervention	on	behalf	of	a	government	or	insurgent	organizations	may	also	increase	the	intervening	state’s	risk	of	terrorist	reprisals	by	prolonging	a	civil	conflict,	and	hence	fostering	the	root	causes	that	can	encourage	the	emergence	of	terrorist	organizations.	Third	party	intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	that	topples	a	government	may	prolong	a	civil	conflict	by	creating	a	power	vacuum	if	a	legitimate	government	is	not	quickly	formed	to	replace	the	former	regime.	Unsuccessful	intervention	on	behalf	of	an	embattled	regime	may	similarly	prolong	civil	conflict	by	sustaining	a	regime	that	would	have	otherwise	collapsed.		Either	situation	may	lead	to	increasingly	factionalized	conflicts	and	failed	states	in	which	terrorist	organizations	can	easily	operate.	A	successful	intervention	on	behalf	of	a	regime	may	still	increase	the	incidence	of	international	terrorism	in	the	short	term	since	insurgent	organizations	may	be	more	likely	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics	once	their	conventional	forces	begin	to	fail.	Finally,	any	intervention	may	
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lead	to	collateral	damage	that	in	turn	may	lead	the	population	of	a	conflict	area	to	support	terrorist	organizations.	For	these	reasons,	I	predict	that	intervention	on	behalf	of	governments	and	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	will	both	increase	the	incidence	of	international	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state	in	the	short	term.		H1:	Intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	in	support	of	a	government	will	increase	the	probability	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state	by	actors	involved	in	that	civil	conflict.		H2:	Intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	in	support	of	insurgent	organizations	will	increase	the	probability	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state	by	actors	involved	in	that	civil	conflict.		Nonetheless,	intervention	on	behalf	of	a	regime	likely	increases	the	incidence	of	terrorist	reprisals	against	the	intervening	state	to	a	lesser	degree	than	does	intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgents,	because	the	former	type	of	intervention	allows	for	the	maintenance	of	existing	government	structures	while	the	latter	does	not.	Successful	third	party	state	intervention	may	reshape	the	balance	of	power	in	a	civil	conflict	in	a	way	that	allows	a	regime	to	restore	control	over	its	territory	and	eliminate	terrorist	organizations	operating	there.	Because	this	type	of	intervention	allows	for	the	maintenance	of	the	supported	regime’s	existing	government	structures,	it	may	more	quickly	restore	rule	of	law	and	decrease	the	likelihood	that	the	conflict	area	might	become	a	failed	state.	Even	intervention	that	does	not	successfully	enable	a	regime	to	eliminate	insurgent	organizations	operating	within	
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its	territory	may	enable	the	intervening	state	to	utilize	the	regime	as	an	agent	for	counterterrorist	operations	within	the	conflict	area.		By	supporting	a	regime	during	a	civil	conflict	a	state	may	be	able	to	utilize	that	regime	as	a	long-term	agent	to	combat	a	terrorist	organization	that	the	intervening	state	sees	as	a	threat.	Continued	aid	may	be	used	as	political	leverage	to	ensure	that	the	agent	state	continues	to	target	terrorist	organizations	operating	within	its	borders.	The	maintenance	of	existing	power	structures	within	a	civil	conflict	area	may	lead	to	more	successful	state	building	efforts	and	application	of	foreign	aid,	which	may	encourage	long-term	stability.	In	this	way,	intervention	on	behalf	of	regimes	may	enable	states	to	promote	stability	within	a	conflict	area	and	gain	an	agent	that	the	principal	state	can	utilize	to	combat	terrorist	organizations	operating	within	the	conflict	zone.			 Intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	may	be	more	likely	to	foster	conditions	of	anarchy	and	failed	states	in	which	terrorist	organizations	can	thrive.		Because	many	insurgent	movements	are	fragmented,	non-hierarchical,	and	aligned	in	large	part	by	their	opposition	to	a	regime,	there	may	not	be	a	clear	line	of	succession	if	their	target	government	falls	from	power.	Power	struggles	may	then	break	out	among	former	insurgent	organizations	leading	to	longer,	more	fragmented	civil	wars.		If	intervention	is	unable	to	decisively	remove	the	target	regime	from	power,	intervention	may	have	little	effect	on	the	probability	of	terrorist	attacks,	or	may	add	to	the	human	costs	of	war	and	therefore	foster	conditions	in	which	terrorist	groups	are	likely	to	arise.	Finally,	utilizing	a	government	as	an	agent	in	the	fight	against	a	terrorist	organization	operating	within	a	civil	conflict	area	
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allows	the	intervening	state	to	target	terrorist	organizations	directly,	while	supporting	insurgents	combatting	a	state	sponsor	of	terrorism	may	only	allow	third	party	states	to	target	the	terrorist	organization	indirectly	by	cutting	off	its	support.		H3:	Intervention	on	behalf	of	regimes	besieged	by	insurgents	will	increase	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state	to	a	lesser	degree	than	would	intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations.			The	type	of	support	that	a	state	offers	to	a	belligerent	in	a	civil	conflict	likely	has	as	strong	an	effect	on	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state	as	does	the	type	of	actor	that	a	state	chooses	to	support.	If	a	state	wishes	to	sway	a	civil	conflict	without	deploying	its	own	military	forces,	it	may	choose	to	employ	a	regime	or	insurgent	organization	as	an	agent	within	a	given	civil	conflict.	Utilizing	a	belligerent	as	an	agent	in	a	civil	conflict	offers	numerous	potential	benefits	to	a	state	since	it	can	influence	the	outcome	of	a	conflict	without	placing	its	own	military	at	risk.	Utilizing	an	agent	might	also	provide	a	cheaper	alternative	to	direct	military	intervention	since,	instead	of	undergoing	a	costly	military	deployment,	an	intervening	state	can	instead	provide	its	agent	with	the	means	to	wage	war	on	its	behalf.	To	influence	a	civil	conflict	in	this	way,	states	may	choose	to	provide	an	insurgent	organization	or	a	regime	with	training,	weapons,	funding,	or	other	material	support	like	vehicles,	communications	equipment,	or	medical	supplies.		Such	non-warring	support	may	shift	the	balance	of	power	in	the	supported	actor’s	favor	to	a	sufficient	degree	that	it	leads	to	a	conflict	outcome	favorable	to	the	intervening	state.	Nonetheless,	non-warring	support	may	place	the	intervening	state	at	increased	risk	of	terrorist	attack	relative	to	conditions	of	non-intervention	since,	
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if	non-warring	support	influences	the	balance	of	power	in	a	conflict,	belligerents	opposed	to	the	intervening	state	may	utilize	terrorist	tactics	against	the	intervening	state	in	order	to	coerce	that	state	into	ceasing	its	intervention.	As	previously	discussed,	it	remains	controversial	whether	actors	actually	utilize	terrorism	in	pursuit	of	specific	political	goals	since	terrorist	tactics	rarely	affect	the	behavior	of	their	targets	in	ways	beneficial	to	the	terrorist	organization.	Even	if	an	actor	does	not	predict	that	employment	of	terrorist	tactics	will	dissuade	a	state	from	supporting	its	opponent,	however,	it	may	utilize	terrorism	in	order	to	foster	cohesion	and	bolster	recruitment	by	achieving	a	symbolic	victory	against	an	intervening	state.	In	any	event,	any	non-warring	support	that	sufficiently	weakens	an	opponent	may	encourage	the	use	of	terrorist	tactics	by	that	opponent	since	actors	seem	more	likely	to	deploy	terrorist	tactics	as	their	conventional	forces	fail.		 Non-military	support	for	a	belligerent	in	a	civil	conflict	poses	unique	dangers	to	the	intervening	state	since	principal-agent	theory	stipulates	that	agents	may	not	continue	to	act	in	their	patron’s	best	interest	as	a	conflict	develops.	Agents	may	grow	in	power	as	they	benefit	from	support	from	the	principal	actor.	If	an	agent	becomes	powerful	enough,	it	may	no	longer	depend	on	the	principal	actor’s	support	for	success,	and	the	principal	actor	may	lose	its	ability	to	constrain	the	actions	of	the	agent.	In	a	civil	conflict	environment	where	actors	continually	fracture,	change	sides,	and	shift	their	political	goals,	supporting	an	agent	can	become	dangerous	for	a	state	since	that	agent	may	eventually	turn	against	the	intervener	or	pursue	divergent	political	goals.	Even	if	an	agent	remains	reliable,	merely	providing	non-warring	support	to	an	actor	in	a	civil	conflict	may	not	shift	the	balance	of	power	
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sufficiently	to	achieve	the	intervener’s	desired	outcome.	For	these	reasons,	a	state	may	choose	to	utilize	its	own	military	capability	by	deploying	ground	forces	in	support	of	a	regime	or	insurgents.		Such	warring	support	may	increase	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	reprisals	against	the	intervening	state	for	the	same	reasons	as	non-warring	intervention,	but	also	poses	additional	problems.	The	deployment	of	ground	forces	can	cause	large	amounts	of	collateral	damage,	which	terrorist	organizations	can	utilize	for	propaganda	purposes	in	order	to	bolster	their	recruitment.	If	an	intervening	state	becomes	unpopular	among	the	populace	within	a	conflict	area	due	to	the	collateral	damage	caused	by	warring	intervention,	the	populace	may	become	increasingly	sympathetic	to	terrorist	organizations	resisting	the	intervening	state.	These	factors	can	combine	to	create	more	powerful	terrorist	organizations	that	can	operate	freely	amongst	a	sympathetic	population.	In	such	an	event,	terrorist	organizations	could	draw	increased	numbers	of	recruits	and	other	support	from	the	population	of	a	conflict	area.	For	these	reasons,	I	predict	that	warring	intervention	will	have	a	greater	positive	effect	on	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states	than	would	non-warring	intervention.	H4:	Warring	intervention	in	support	of	either	a	government	or	insurgent	organization	in	a	civil	conflict	will	increase	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state	by	belligerents	within	the	civil	conflict	to	a	greater	extent	than	would	non-warring	intervention.		
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Methods		 I	tested	my	hypotheses	using	a	statistical	analysis	of	data	regarding	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	terrorist	attacks.	This	analysis	included	cases	from	2001	to	the	present.	By	focusing	on	this	time	period	I	hoped	to	determine	how	third	party	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	may	affect	the	incidence	of	terrorist	attacks	during	the	era	defined	as	the	Global	War	on	Terror,	since	the	global	incidence	of	terrorism	has	increased	substantially	during	this	time.	Focusing	on	a	relatively	narrow	time	frame	also	allowed	me	to	partially	exclude	long-term	increases	in	the	frequency	of	terrorism	that	are	due	to	changing	geopolitical	conditions	that	could	skew	data	if	a	larger	sample	size	were	used.	I	compiled	information	regarding	state	interventions	in	civil	conflicts	from	the	Uppsala	Conflict	Data	Program’s	External	Support	Dataset.	For	cases	between	2001	and	2010	I	utilized	the	disaggregated	supporter-level	version	of	the	UCDP	external	support	dataset,	because	this	version	coded	for	various	types	of	intervention	rather	than	simply	indicating	whether	or	not	a	state	intervened	in	a	civil	conflict.	Because	the	disaggregated	supporter-level	dataset	only	included	cases	from	2001	to	2010,	I	utilized	the	UCDP	Armed	Conflict	Dataset	for	cases	between	2010	and	2015.	The	UCDP	Armed	Conflict	dataset	included	only	cases	in	which	the	intervening	state	deployed	ground	forces	in	combat	roles.		 Using	the	UCDP	External	Support	and	Armed	Conflict	datasets,	I	created	a	dataset	that	cataloged	all	cases	of	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	between	2001	and	2015.	I	used	each	case	of	intervention	or	continued	intervention	per	intervener-target	dyad	year	as	my	unit	of	analysis.		For	every	case	in	the	dataset,	I	recorded	
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whether	the	intervener	supported	a	government	or	an	insurgent	organization	using	two	dummy	variables.	For	cases	between	2001	and	2010,	I	also	indicated	whether	the	intervener	deployed	ground	forces	in	a	combat	role	or	provided	weapons,	training,	material,	or	an	unknown	type	of	support	to	a	belligerent	in	each	civil	conflict.	I	coded	these	variables	as	five	dummy	variables	that	indicated	whether	or	not	the	intervener	had	provided	any	level	of	each	type	of	support	per	each	dyad	year.	Because	the	UCDP	external	support	dataset	only	included	cases	up	to	2010,	cases	in	my	dataset	between	2011	and	2015	only	included	whether	the	intervener	had	deployed	ground	forces.				 I	hypothesize	that	intervention	should	have	a	latent	effect	on	the	number	of	terrorist	attacks	against	an	intervening	state	that	extends	well	beyond	the	year	of	each	actual	intervention.	After	a	state	intervenes	in	a	civil	conflict	its	target	likely	requires	time	to	both	decide	to	deploy	terrorist	tactics	against	the	intervening	state	and	to	plan	and	execute	such	attacks.	Because	the	literature	suggests	that	combatants	seem	more	likely	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics	once	their	conventional	military	forces	fail,	it	may	take	time	for	an	intervention	to	degrade	its	target	to	a	sufficient	degree	for	that	combatant	to	consider	terrorist	tactics.	To	capture	the	latent	effects	of	intervention	on	the	incidence	of	terrorist	attacks	on	the	intervening	state,	I	included	the	five	years	after	the	conclusion	of	each	intervention	as	separate	dyad-year	cases.	The	value	of	each	intervention	variable	in	these	extended	cases	exactly	reflected	those	of	the	last	actual	intervention	in	each	dyad.		To	compare	the	effects	of	intervention	with	cases	of	non-intervention,	I	similarly	included	the	five	years	before	each	intervention	as	separate	dyad	years	
	 20	
with	all	intervention	variables	set	to	zero.	This	extended	the	time-window	of	each	dyad	to	ten	years,	plus	the	years	of	actual	intervention.		This	window	did	not	include	dates	after	2015,	as	intervention	data	was	not	available	for	these	dates.	If,	when	including	cases	for	the	five	years	before	an	intervention,	the	sample	included	a	case	before	2001	where	an	intervention	had	in	fact	taken	place,	I	coded	the	five	years	after	that	case	of	intervention	using	the	same	criteria	as	I	would	have	for	cases	that	occurred	after	2001.	I	did	not,	however,	extend	my	analysis	into	the	five	years	before	such	cases.	For	this	reason,	some	dyads	that	reflect	the	five	years	before	a	case	of	intervention	in	the	2001-2004	range	had	positive	values	for	their	intervention	variables	when	they	would	normally	indicate	conditions	of	non-intervention.	This	occurred	in	a	very	small	number	of	cases.		For	each	case	in	my	dataset,	I	recorded	the	number	of	terrorist	attacks	that	a	combatant	in	that	case’s	civil	conflict	had	carried	out	against	the	intervening	state.	I	coded	the	number	of	such	attacks	as	a	discreet	variable,	which	I	utilized	as	the	dependent	variable	in	my	analysis.	I	utilized	the	Global	Terrorism	Database’s	three	criteria	for	an	instance	of	terrorism.	Accordingly,	to	qualify	as	an	instance	of	terrorism	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis:	The	[attack]	must	be	aimed	at	attaining	a	political,	economic,	religious,	or	social	goal,	there	must	be	evidence	of	an	intention	to	coerce,	intimidate,	or	convey	some	other	message	to	a	larger	audience	(or	audiences)	than	the	immediate	victim,	and	the	action	must	be	outside	the	context	of	legitimate	warfare	activities2.		
																																																								2	These	are	the	exact	criteria	given	by	the	Global	Terrorism	Database	for	cases	of	terrorism.	
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My	dataset	included	a	total	of	2,536	cases	of	intervention.	I	did	not	include	interventions	by	Tonga	or	Mongolia	since	the	Global	Terrorism	Database	includes	neither	country	in	its	data.	I	included	all	cases	of	intervention	in	which	at	least	one	actor	qualified	as	a	terrorist	organization	by	GTD	standards.	I	used	linear	regression	to	test	two	models	of	the	relationship	between	state	intervention	in	civil	conflict	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state.	Model	1included	dummy	variables	that	indicated	whether	the	intervening	state	had	supported	a	government	or	an	insurgent	organization	in	each	examined	case.	For	cases	of	non-intervention,	I	set	each	variable	equal	to	zero.	The	“Contiguity”	variable	indicated	whether	the	intervening	state	shared	a	land	or	sea	border	of	up	to	400	miles	with	the	relevant	civil	conflict	area.		Model	2	included	variables	that	identified	what	type	of	support	the	intervening	state	provided.	For	cases	of	non-intervention,	I	coded	each	intervention	variable	as	zero.	As	in	the	first	model,	the	“Contiguity”	variable	served	as	a	control	variable.	In	addition	to	the	linear	analyses	displayed	in	tables	1	and	2	of	the	Results	section,	I	also	performed	logistic	regression	analyses	on	Model	1	and	Model	2.	Results	from	my	logistic	regression	analyses	can	be	found	in	tables	3	and	4	in	the	appendix.	My	thesis	concludes	with	a	case	study	of	the	2015	Paris	attacks,	which	helps	to	illustrate	the	empirical	findings	of	my	statistical	analyses.		
Results	and	Analysis	All	variables	within	Model	1	served	as	both	statistically	and	practically	significant	predictors	of	the	incidence	of	terrorism	by	actors	within	a	civil	conflict	against	the	intervening	state.	Results	from	Model	1’s	linear	regression	analysis	can	be	found	in	the	following	table.	
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Table	1:	Linear	regression	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	type	of	actor	
supported	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.	
	Terror	 Coefficient	 Standard	Error	 T	Value	 P	Value	
Support	Government	 .525	 .105	 		4.97	 0.000	
Support	Insurgents	 -.709	 .188	 -3.76	 0.000	
Contiguity	 1.409	 .139	 10.07	 0.000	
Constant	 -.227		 .139	 -2.70	 0.007	
N		 2,509	
R2	 .0447			 		 Model	1	provided	support	for	Hypothesis	1.		As	anticipated,	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	on	behalf	of	governments	proved	a	strong	positive	predictor	for	the	incidence	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state.	Model	1	predicted	that,	all	else	held	constant,	a	state	that	intervened	in	a	civil	conflict	on	behalf	of	a	government	would	experience	.525	more	terrorist	attacks	than	would	a	state	that	did	not	intervene.	This	accords	with	the	theory	presented	in	this	thesis,	which	stated	that	insurgent	organizations	might	conduct	terrorist	attacks	against	a	state	that	intervenes	against	them	in	order	to	make	such	an	intervention	excessively	costly,	and	hence	encourage	the	intervening	state	to	withdraw.	As	previously	discussed,	intervention	may	prolong	civil	conflicts	and	lead	to	increased	collateral	damage,	which	may	also	increase	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state.	That	Model	1	supports	Hypothesis	1	is	consistent	with	each	component	of	the	theory	presented	by	this	thesis.			Conversely,	Model	1	did	not	support	Hypothesis	2.	Analysis	of	the	“Support	Insurgents”	variable	produced	a	negative	coefficient,	which	directly	contradicts	my	theory	regarding	the	relationship	between	intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgent	
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organizations	and	the	incidence	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state.	Model	1	predicted	that	a	state	that	intervened	on	behalf	of	an	insurgent	organization	would	experience	.709	fewer	terrorist	attacks	by	actors	in	the	relevant	civil	conflict	than	would	a	state	that	did	not	intervene	in	support	of	an	insurgent	organization.	This	thesis	theorized	that,	if	a	government	intervened	on	behalf	of	an	insurgent	organization,	that	intervention	could	destabilize	a	civil	conflict	area	sufficiently	to	allow	for	terrorist	organizations	to	develop	and	operate	safely.	Since	insurgent	organizations	often	deploy	terrorist	tactics,	this	thesis	predicted	that	allowing	such	organizations	to	survive,	fragment,	or	become	dominant	actors	within	a	conflict	could	become	dangerous	for	a	state	since	principal-agent	theory	suggests	that	supported	agents	may	eventually	turn	against	their	supporting	actors.	Findings	from	Model	1	indicated	that	this	is	probably	not	typically	what	occurs.		Possibly,	because	insurgent	organizations	do	not	typically	have	the	conventional	military	strength	of	states,	they	may	utilize	terrorism	to	overcome	conventional	military	weaknesses	more	readily	than	would	organizations	aligned	to	a	government.	Because	many	insurgent	organizations	have	extremist	ideologies,	and	many	network-based	terrorist	organizations	like	Al	Qaeda	or	The	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	often	take	part	in	multiple	civil	conflicts,	intervening	on	behalf	of	a	government	in	a	civil	conflict	might	pose	substantial	risks	to	the	intervening	state.	Though	the	risks	associated	with	supporting	insurgent	organizations	as	agents	in	a	civil	conflict	suggested	by	this	thesis	may	remain	valid,	the	data	in	Model	1	indicated	that	risks	associated	with	targeting	insurgent	organizations	place	the	intervening	state	in	relatively	greater	danger	of	terrorist	reprisals.		
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Of	the	six	independent	variables	included	in	Model	2,	only	deployment	of	ground	forces	in	a	combat	role,	provision	of	weapons,	and	contiguity	with	a	civil	conflict	area	served	as	statistically	significant	predictors	of	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	an	intervening	state.	Table	2	displays	results	from	Model	2’s	linear	regression.		
Table	2:	Linear	regression	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	type	of	
intervention	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.		Terror	 Coefficient	 Standard	Error	 T	Value	 P	Value	
Troop	Deployment	
(Combatants)	
.332	 .145	 2.28	 0.022		
Weapons	 		-.406	 .177	 -2.29	 0.022	
Training	 		.166	 .141	 1.41	 0.239			
Material		 -.190	 .174	 -1.09	 0.275	
Unknown	Support	 .176	 .291	 0.61	 0.545	
Contiguity	 		1.06	 .141	 7.49	 0.000	
Constant	 -.020	 .084	 -0.24	 0.814	
N	 2,148	
R2	 .029				 Analysis	of	Model	2	provided	substantial	support	for	Hypothesis	4.	Model	2	indicated	that	deployment	of	ground	forces	served	as	a	strong	predictor	for	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	an	intervening	state.	As	indicated	in	Table	2,	an	intervening	state	that	deployed	ground	forces	in	a	combat	role	in	a	given	civil	conflict	was	predicted	to	experience	.332	more	terrorist	attacks	than	states	that	did	not	deploy	such	forces.	Additionally,	Model	2	indicated	that,	all	else	held	constant,	a	state	that	provided	weapons	to	an	actor	in	a	civil	conflict	would	experience	.406	fewer	terrorist	attacks,	which	further	suggests	that	only	warring	intervention	serves	as	a	significant	positive	predictor	of	terrorism.	That	the	remaining	intervention	variables	in	Model	2	did	not	constitute	statistically	significant	predictors	for	
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terrorism	similarly	strengthened	Hypothesis	4	since	they	also	indicated	various	types	of	non-warring	support.	This	supports	my	theory	that	forms	of	intervention	that	cause	increased	collateral	damage,	and	that	designate	the	intervening	state	as	a	secondary	warring	party	in	the	conflict,	should	lead	to	higher	rates	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state.		The	findings	of	this	thesis	indicate	a	more	complex	relationship	between	third	party	state	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state	than	my	theory	anticipated.		The	strong	negative	coefficients	associated	with	the	“Support	Insurgents”	and	“Weapons”	variables	suggested	that	certain	types	of	intervention	might	in	fact	decrease	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	attacks	against	the	intervening	state3.	Though	this	contradicts	some	aspects	of	my	theory,	it	does	suggest	that	the	relationship	between	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states	depends	on	the	specific	nature	of	each	intervention.		Though	this	thesis	demonstrated	that	different	types	of	intervention	in	civil	conflict	could	affect	rates	of	terrorism	against	the	intervening	state	in	different	ways,	the	bulk	of	variation	in	the	incidence	of	terrorist	attacks	by	belligerents	in	a	civil	conflict	against	intervening	states	likely	depends	on	factors	independent	of	the	intervention	itself	and	outside	of	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	Model	1	produced	an	R2	value	of	.0447	while	Model	2	produced	an	R2	value	of	.029,	indicating	that	these	models	accounted	for	4.4%	and	2.9%	of	variation	in	the	incidence	of	terrorist	attacks	against	intervening	states	respectively.																																																									3	Logistic	Regression	indicated	that	the	“Weapons”	and	“Support	Insurgents”	variables	did	not	serve	as	statistically	significant	predictors	for	terrorism.	
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	In	both	models,	a	state’s	contiguity	to	a	civil	conflict	zone	represented	the	strongest	predictor	of	terrorist	attacks	by	actors	within	that	civil	conflict	against	the	intervening	state.	Model	1	predicted	that	a	state	contiguous	to	a	civil	conflict	would	experience	1.4	more	terrorist	attacks	by	actors	within	that	conflict	than	would	a	state	that	did	not	share	a	border	with	the	state	in	which	the	conflict	took	place.	Model	2	produced	a	somewhat	lower	coefficient	of	around	1	for	the	contiguity	variable.	The	strength	of	the	contiguity	variable	is	likely	due	to	cases	in	which	insurgent	organizations	actively	pursue	related	political	goals	in	multiple	contiguous	states.	The	Taliban’s	involvement	in	both	Afghanistan	and	Pakistan	likely	presents	a	typical	example	of	how	contiguity	can	lead	a	belligerent	in	one	civil	conflict	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics	to	pursue	goals	in	a	contiguous	state	not	necessarily	related	to	that	state’s	intervention	in	the	primary	conflict.	Though	the	models	examined	in	this	thesis	account	for	only	a	small	percentage	of	variation	in	rates	of	international	terrorism	against	states	that	intervene	in	civil	conflicts,	they	sufficiently	indicated	that	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	could	lead	to	increased	rates	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states	if	such	interventions	provide	direct	warring	support	to	a	belligerent	in	that	conflict,	support	a	government,	or	if	the	intervening	state	shares	a	border	with	the	civil	conflict	area.		
Case	Study	France’s	intervention	against	Islamic	State	in	Iraq	and	Syria	provides	an	illustrative	case	study	of	how	warring	intervention	against	insurgents	classified	as	terrorist	organizations	can	result	in	terrorist	reprisals	against	the	intervening	state.	France	began	to	launch	airstrikes	against	Islamic	State	targets	in	Iraq	in	2014	and	
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later	in	Syria	in	2015	(France	launches	first	air	strikes	2015),	in	coordination	with	an	international	coalition	led	by	the	United	States	(Valls	2015).	These	airstrikes	supported	the	Iraqi	government,	as	well	as	moderate	insurgents	and	Kurdish	Peshmerga	fighters	engaged	in	combat	with	IS	fighters	on	the	ground	in	Syria	(Valls	2015).	In	2015	then	French	Prime	Minister	Manuel	Valls	gave	a	speech	to	the	French	parliament,	which	outlined	the	general	strategy	and	rationale	behind	France’s	intervention	in	Syria.	In	this	speech,	Valls	identified	IS	as	an	imminent	threat	to	French	security	due	to	its	utilization	of	terrorist	tactics,	efforts	to	recruit	French	civilians,	and	destabilizing	effect	on	the	middle-east	that	produced	large	amounts	of	refugees	from	Iraq	and	Syria	(Valls	2015).	Many	of	these	refugees	eventually	sought	asylum	in	France	(Valls	2015).	That	IS	often	utilized	French	language	social	media	in	its	recruitment	efforts	posed	particular	concern	due	its	potential	capability	to	inspire	French	citizens	sympathetic	to	IS	to	carry	out	terrorist	attacks	against	the	French	state	(Valls	2015).		Valls’s	statement	clearly	illustrates	why	a	state	may	intervene	in	a	civil	conflict	in	a	calculated	attempt	to	minimize	its	risks	of	falling	victim	to	terrorist	attacks	by	belligerents	within	that	conflict.	The	civil	conflicts	in	Syria	and	Iraq	created	conditions	of	lawlessness	that	enabled	IS	to	successfully	seize	and	govern	territory	within	the	civil	conflict	area.	Prior	to	French	intervention,	IS	had	identified	France	as	a	potential	target	and	had	made	considerable	efforts	to	find	recruits	using	French	language	propaganda.	For	these	reasons,	the	French	calculated	that	it	was	within	their	interests	to	degrade	and	destroy	IS,	but	found	it	excessively	costly	as	well	as	politically	and	logistically	unfeasible	to	deploy	ground	forces.	To	overcome	
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these	challenges,	the	French	government	decided	to	utilize	the	Iraqi	government,	moderate	Syrian	rebels,	and	the	Kurdish	Peshmerga	as	agents	in	its	fight	against	Islamic	State.	In	doing	so,	however,	France	may	have	increased	the	strategic	incentive	for	IS	to	utilize	terrorist	tactics	against	it	since	any	action	that	coerced	France	to	end	its	air	campaign	could	help	to	restructure	the	balance	of	power	in	Syria	and	Iraq	in	IS’s	favor.		IS	did	in	fact	deploy	terrorist	tactics	against	Paris	shortly	after	France	began	its	military	campaign	in	Syria.	On	November	13,	two	months	after	France	began	its	campaign	of	airstrikes	in	Syria,	seven	men	armed	with	assault	rifles	and	explosives	conducted	coordinated	attacks	against	the	Stade	de	France,	restaurants,	and	the	Bataclan	concert	hall	(Callimachi	2015).	These	attacks	killed	a	total	of	130	civilians.	The	following	day,	Islamic	State	published	a	message	online	claiming	responsibility	for	the	attacks	(Callimachi	2015).	In	this	message,	Islamic	state	claimed	that	it	had	orchestrated	the	2015	Paris	attack	in	retaliation	for	France’s	use	of	airstrikes	in	Iraq	and	Syria,	claiming	that	more	attacks	would	follow	if	France	continued	to	support	the	US-led	coalition	(Dalton	et	al	2015).	French	intelligence	officials	confirmed	IS’s	claim,	and	French	president	Francois	Hollande	released	a	statement	that	condemned	IS	as	the	perpetrators	of	the	attack	(Callimachi	2015).		French	intelligence	officials	stated	that	the	seven	men	who	carried	out	the	attack	had	maintained	personal	correspondence	with	Islamic	State	personnel	in	Iraq	and	Syria	while	planning	their	attack	(Dalton	et	al	2015).		The	2015	Paris	attacks	provide	a	clear	example	of	how	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	in	order	to	combat	a	terrorist	threat	can	itself	provoke	a	terrorist	response.	
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According	to	the	message	in	which	IS	claimed	responsibility	for	the	Paris	attacks,	IS	intended	for	these	attacks	to	make	the	cost	of	continuing	airstrikes	sufficiently	high	that	France	would	cease	its	campaign.	As	noted	in	the	literature	review,	however,	it	remains	unclear	whether	terrorist	organizations’	stated	goals	actually	reflect	the	underlying	strategy	behind	their	use	of	terrorist	tactics.	Alternatively,	Islamic	State	may	have	sought	to	utilize	the	Paris	attacks	to	build	credibility	amongst	potentially	sympathetic	populations,	and	thus	increase	their	recruitment	prospects.	The	strong	positive	reaction	elicited	among	extremists	on	social	media	in	the	wake	of	the	Paris	attacks	lends	some	credibility	to	the	potential	value	of	such	a	strategy.	Finally,	Islamic	State	may	have	intended	to	utilize	the	Paris	attacks	to	provoke	French	retaliation,	thus	increasing	collateral	damage	and	the	social	conditions	that	can	encourage	civilians	to	support	extremist	organizations.	This	rationale,	however,	seems	unlikely	since	Islamic	State	is	not	a	network-based	organization	but	rather	a	self-styled	caliphate	that	seeks	to	govern	its	territory	as	a	legitimate	state,	and	would	thus	suffer	acutely	if	its	cities	and	infrastructure	were	damaged.			Regardless	of	the	strategic	intent	of	the	attacks,	France’s	interventions	in	Iraq	and	Syria	likely	increased	the	likelihood	that	Islamic	State	would	utilize	terrorist	tactics	against	it.	If	Islamic	State	sought	to	bolster	its	recruitment	potential	by	achieving	a	symbolic	victory	over	a	perceived	enemy,	attacking	a	target	actively	involved	in	Iraq	and	Syria	likely	had	greater	political	value	than	attacking	an	uninvolved	target.	If	Islamic	State	sought	to	provoke	a	strong	military	response	that	would	result	in	collateral	damage,	it	would	likely	prefer	to	choose	a	target	already	involved	in	the	civil	conflict	since	that	state	would	have	already	expressed	its	
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willingness	to	intervene.	In	such	a	situation	the	intervening	state	would	merely	have	to	intensify	its	military	campaign,	while	a	state	not	engaged	in	the	conflict	would	have	to	make	the	initial	choice	to	intervene.	Regardless	of	whether	Islamic	State	orchestrated	the	2015	Paris	attacks	primarily	in	pursuit	of	its	stated	goals	or	in	order	to	bolster	its	recruitment	capabilities,	France’s	interventions	in	Iraq	and	Syria	likely	provoked	the	attack.	This	would	accord	with	the	empirical	findings	of	this	thesis.		
Conclusion		 France’s	interventions	in	Iraq	and	Syria	clearly	demonstrate	both	why	a	state	might	intervene	in	a	civil	conflict	in	a	calculated	attempt	to	target	terrorist	organizations,	and	how	intervention	may	itself	provoke	terrorist	reprisals.	The	complexity	of	the	relationship	between	state	interventions	in	civil	conflicts	and	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states,	and	the	abundant	disagreement	in	the	literature	regarding	the	nature	of	this	relationship,	makes	understanding	the	unique	effects	of	specific	types	of	intervention	both	an	important	area	of	study	and	a	crucial	policy	concern.	The	empirical	findings	of	this	thesis	support	my	theory	that	the	relationship	between	third	party	state	interventions	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	an	intervening	state	depends,	in	part,	on	what	tactics	that	state	utilizes	during	its	intervention,	and	on	what	type	of	actor	the	state	supports.	Specifically,	warring	interventions	and	interventions	that	support	governments	seem	to	lead	to	increased	rates	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states	while	non-warring	interventions	and	those	on	behalf	of	insurgent	organizations	generally	do	not.	
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	 These	findings	suggest	that	states	considering	warring	intervention	in	a	civil	conflict	or	intervention	on	behalf	of	a	government	should	carefully	consider	the	potential	for	terrorist	reprisals	in	their	initial	cost-benefit	analysis	prior	to	intervention.	If	such	states	still	calculate	intervention	as	within	their	best	interests,	they	should	take	care	to	strengthen	their	domestic	security	apparatuses	to	prepare	for	terrorist	reprisals.	Conversely,	states	considering	a	non-warring	intervention	or	intervention	on	behalf	of	insurgents	may	weigh	the	potential	for	terrorist	reprisals	more	lightly,	though	the	potential	for	such	reprisals	remains	present.		Though	this	thesis	found	statistically	significant	relationships	between	certain	types	of	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	frequency	of	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states,	my	models	accounted	for	only	a	small	percentage	of	variation	in	the	frequency	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.	Other	factors	regarding	the	nature	of	intervening	states,	supported	actors,	and	the	conflicts	themselves	likely	contribute	to	the	probability	of	terrorist	reprisals	following	an	intervention.	Future	empirical	studies	should	attempt	to	create	more	robust	models	of	the	relationship	between	state	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	the	likelihood	of	terrorist	retaliation.	Nonetheless,	this	thesis	succeeded	in	its	goal	of	demonstrating	that	the	relationship	between	intervention	in	civil	conflicts	and	terrorist	reprisals	against	intervening	states	likely	depends	on	the	specific	nature	of	each	intervention.					
	 32	
	Appendix	Tables	3	and	4	respectively	display	results	from	Model	1	and	Model	2’s	logistic	regression	analyses.	
Table	3:	Logistic	regression	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	type	of	actor	
supported	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.	
	Terror	 Coefficient	 P	Value	
Support	Government	 1.91	 0.000	
Support	Insurgents	 -.168	 0.685	
Contiguity	 2.79	 0.000	
N	 2,509	
Pseudo	R2	 0.197		
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Table	4:		Logistic	regression	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	type	of	
intervention	and	the	incidence	of	terrorism	against	intervening	states.	
	Terror	 Coefficient	 P	Value	
Troop	Deployment	
(Combatants)	
2.53	 0.000	
Weapons	 .074	 0.836	
Training	 -.525	 0.077	
Material	 -.084	 0.830	
Unknown	Support	 1.14	 0.049	
Contiguity	 2.47	 0.000	
N	 2,148	
Pseudo	R2	 0.181	
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